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Section 1. Introductionl
It is sometimes said that Engel's Law is the most universally accepted proposi-
tion in applied econometrics. It is therefore not surprising that many authors
have investigated the empirical plausibility of various Engel functions, start.
ing with the classic studies of WorlQng (1943) and Leser (1961). Leser, in
particular, found that Engel functions of the form q; - a; f b;x ~- c;x log x
provided the best fit to cross-section data on the quantities q; of commodity i
and on income x. However, if this function is rewritten in terms of the budget
shares w; - p;q;~x, it implies that w; is unbounded as x tends to infinity, un-
less c; - 0. Since the budget shares sum to unity, this means that the previous
Engel funetion must predict some negative budget shares for suflïciently high
income levels, unless quasi-homotheticity obtains (c; - 0 for all i). The same
observation can be made for Engel functions derived from demand systems
of the PIGLOG form (such as the AIDS model), where a; - 0 for all i. To
the best of our lmowledge, this simple fact has never been mentioned in the
literature.
In the case of an individual agent, budget share positivity can be guaran-
teed if the demand functions are derived from the Kuhn-Tlicker conditions for
utility maximization. It is, however, implausible that the rational represen-
tative consumers of Gorman (1953) and Muellbauer (1976) would face corner
solutions in their budget allocation problem. Hence, the requirement that a
predicted budget share lie between zero and one is a regularity condition of
a different nature than the differentiability, monotonicity and concavity of a
cost function: whereas the latter conditions must be verified both by an indi-
vidual agent's preferences and by the preferences of a rational representative
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agent, requiring the absence of corner solutions only appears reasonable at
the aggregate level (for the representative agent) and on empirical grounds (a
demand system that can predict negative budget shares is bound to yield non-
sensical simulation results with some data sets). Nevertheless, it is intuitively
clear that the positivity requirement is likely to conflict with flexibility, as it is
the case with the other regularity conditions (see Diewert and Wales (1987)).
The purpose of this note is to make this point more precise, aud to investi-
gate which classes of demand systems do in fact guarantee the positivity of
predicted budget shares.
In order to achieve this, Section 2 of this paper will review five broad
classes of demand systems that have akeady been characterized in the liter-
ature. They include most known forms of Engel functions (e.g. homothetic
and quasi-homothetic demands, PIGLOG, PIGL, Translog, and the new func-
tional forms in Gorman (1981) and Lewbel (1987a, 1987b)). In most of thc.sc
cases, exhaustive characterizations (or taxonomies) exist, which identify the
precise functional forms that the Engel functions must take if the demand
system satisfies regularity conditions such as adding-up, homogeneity and
symmetry. This fact will enable us to limit our investigations to two possible
candidate classes. The first one is the class of homothetic demands, which
violates Engel's Law and can thus be further excluded as empirically implau-
sible. The second one is the EXP class of demand systems characterized by
Lewbel (1987b).
Section 3 identifies sufficient monotonicity conditions on preferences
which guarantee the positivity of predicted EXP budget shares (the bounds
that will be obtained are in fact tighter than 0 and 1). It will also be shown
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that the EXP budget shazes aze monotonic in income. Section 4 shows that
the Minflex Laurent system of Barnett (1983) also implies budget share pos-
itivity when that system is globally regular. Section 5 suggests that a funda
mental conflict exists between budget shaze positivity and flexibility. Section
6 concludes.
Section 2. Some taxonomies of demand systema
In this section, we will use results of Gorman (1961, 1981), Lewbel (1987a,
1987b) and Muellbauer (1975) to identify two classes of dema,nd systems guar-
anteeing that the budget shares w; lie between zero and one. Since all the
systems satisfy adding-up (~i w; - 1), it is in fact sufflcient to ensure that
w;~Oforalli.
It is possible in many instances to chazacterize the form of the Engel
curves implied by a particulaz class of demand systems satisfying adding-up,
hom,ogeneity and symmetry. This has been done for the following cases:
~;lass 1: 4i - ai -~ b;x
Class 2: qi - bix f c;f(x)
C'.IáSS 3: 9i - ai f b;x -F ci.f (x)
Class 4: qi - ~ birfr(x)
rER
aif(x) f bi9(x)Class 5: qi - aF(x) f bG(x)
where q; is the demand for good i; x is nominal income; f, g, F, G, and f, aze
differentiable functions of income; and a;, b;, c;, a, 6, and b;r aze differentiable
functions of the prices only.2
Class 1 is the Gorman polar form, which obviously does not solve the
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problem of budget share positivity for all income levels unless a; - 0 for all i
(in this case the demands are homothetic). Indeed, it implies w; - a;~x f,(3;
with a; - a;p; and ,Q; - b;p;. Since ~3; is homogeneous of degree 0 in the
prices, it belongs to a bounded set. Adding-up implies that ~ a; - 0. Hence
in the nonhomothetic case, cr, G 0 for some s; and as x~ 0, w, must become
negative.
Class 2 has been studied by Muellbauer (1975). He shows that if f(x) ~
0, then f(x) must either be equal to x logx (PIGLOG) or to xk with k~
1(PIGL). Since neither function implies bounded budget shares and since
~ w; - 1, neither class ensures budget share positivity. Homothetic demands
are obtained if f(x) - 0.
Class 3 has been studied by Lewbel (1987a). He shows that f(x) must
be either 0, xk, x logx, or log x. Again, it is easy to check that none of these
functions implies bounded budget shares.
Class 4 has been partially characterized by Gorman (1981). He shows
that the rank of B-[b;r~ is at most three. When B has rank 3, we must have
either that f,.(x) - x(logx)r with 0 E R, or that f,.(x) - xrfl with 0 E R,
or that w; is a linear combination of sines and cosines. Again, neither choice
appears to guarantee positive budget shares.
Class 5 has been studied by Lewbel (1987b). He shows that the budget
shares can always be written in the following form:
a: f b;Ï (x)
w'- lfbf(x)
(1)
where f(x) must be either 0, logx, xk, or tan(klogx) for k~ 0. Homothetic
demands are obtained if f(x) - 0; adding-up implies ~ a; - 1 and ~ b; - 6.
S
If b- 0 in (1), we have w; - a; f b;f(x), which is the Class 2 system
and does not imply 0 G w; C 1 as we have seen. If b~ 0, the denomi.nator
in (1) will vanish at some positive income level when f(x) - logx or f(x) -
tan(klogx). If b G 0 and f(x) - xk, then w; becomes unbounded as xk tends
to -b-1 1 0. We conclude that when f(x) ~ 0, it is necessary for 0 G w; G 1
that b~ 0 and that f(x) - xk (the case where f(x) - xk is called the EXP
demand system by Lewbel (19876)). This proves our claim that among the
nonhomothetic systems characterized in this section, only the EXP demands
with b 1 0 can ensure that 0 G w; c 1 at all income levels. In fact, when
bf(x) ~ 0, w; in (1) is a convex combination of a; and b;~b; it is then necessary
and sufficient for 0 G w; C 1 that b~ 0, a; ~ 0 and b; 1 0. We will show
in the next section that this is guaranteed, for EXP demands, by regularity
conditions on preferences.
Section 3. EXP demands and share positivity
The following theorem, which will be used in the proof of Theorem 2 below,
can in fact be extended to all the fractional demand systems in Class 5.
Theorem 1. If f(x) - xk in Equation (1) and ifw; is a differentiable function
of x, then w; is monotonic in x, i.e. táe sign of 8w;~8x does not depend on
x.
Proof: Using ( 1) and letting f- xk, f' - kxk-1, we have:
axi -(1 flbf )2 (b,Y(1 f bf )- bf'(a;
f b~f ))
- (1 f bf)2(btf~ - bf'a;)
f'- (1 } bf)2(b, - ba,). (2)
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The sign of this expression obviously does not depend on x. ~
It is helpful to view EXP as a system derived by means of R.oy's identity:
81og U~81ogp; (3)
w` - - 81og U~81ogx
from the following indirect utility function:
U(p, ~) -~(k f 1)~ f. A(p)~k}1) e-B(n)~ (4)
where A(p) and B(p) are twice differentiable functions of the prices. Homo-
geneity of U in (p, x) requires that A(p) be homogeneous of degree -k and
that eB~p~ be homogeneous of degree 1.
Following Lewbel, we use the notation A; - 8A~81og p; and B; -
óB~8logp;. By Euler's theorem, since A;~A is the price clasticity of A and
since:
8eB
~ Bi - e-B ~ -pR - e-BeB,ap;
we must have that ~ A; --kA and ~ B; - 1. Using (3) and ( 4), we may
write:
~kfiA; - B; ((k ~-1)x -1- Ax~fl~
w' - - (k -~ 1)x -~ (k ~ 1)Ax~fl
B; - k~l (A; - B;A)xk
- 1 f Axk ~ (5)
Equation (5) is a special case of ( 1) with f(x) - xk, a; - B;, b; -(B;A -
A;)~(k f 1), and 6- A.
As is quite obvious from Equation (5), it is sufficient for budget share
positivity that k f 1~ 0, A~ 0, A; G 0 and B; 1 0. The following theorem
provides tighter bounds, and a justifica.tion based on the monotonicity of
preferences.
~
Theorem 2 . If U 1S IL(:TCF]Slilg 111 x, A is not increasing in p, B is uot dc-
creasing in p, and U is homogeneous of degree zero, then either:
OG B;Cw;~ k}1 ~B;- Á~ G1, or:
OG k}1 (B,- Ál Cw; GB; G 1.
Proof: In view of B; - p;8`B~óp; andl A; - p;BA~óp;, the monotonicity
conditions on A and B imply B; 1 0 and A; G 0. By (4), the monotonicity
of U in x implies k~ -1 aad A~ 0. The fact that A; C 0 for all i implies
that k~ 0; indeed, if k G 0, then ~ A; --kA implies that A, ~ 0 for some
s, contradicting the assumption. We may now proceed to prove the claimed
inequalities.
The inequalities 0 G B; c 1 are implied by B; 1 0 for all i and ~ B; - 1.
From Theorem 1, w; is monotonic in x; since, as we have just seen, k~ 0, we
have f' ~ 0 in Equation (2), and:
sign (~x'~ - sign (b; - 6a;) -
sign ~- k -f-1
~A; - B;A~ - AB;~ - sign ~k -F 1 `B' - At I - B') ' (6)
It is obvious from (5) that w; - B; if x- 0. Using (6), this implies:
w;~B; if k}1 (B'- A'~ ~B;
w;GB; if k}1 (B'- Á'~ GB;.
Using (5) and L'Hópital's rule, we se`e that:
lim w;- k}1 (B;- Á'~.
zyoo `
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Using (6) again, we then have:
w' ~ k-~ 1(B' - A~ rf k} 1~B` - A~ 1 B'
wt? k}1 ~B~- Á'~ if k}1 ~B;- Á'~ GB;.
Finally, the inequalities:
05 k~l (B;- Á'1 C 1
are guaranteed by B; ~ 0 for all i, A; C 0 for all i, ~ A; - -kA and
~B~-1- 0
Section 4. Share positivity in the Minflex Laurent system
We will show in this section that the Minflex Laurent (ML) system of Barnett
(1983) also satisfies budget share positivity under regula.rity conditions on
preferences. The ML system may be written as:
w- - ~i } Q~x1,2 f ~t~a (7)' a f Qxr~2 .~ ~,~2
with Q'i - a~iPi~ ~i~~ aiPi,2P~,z, Qi - atPi,2, 7~ -~, .~; b2~p; r,2 -r,2, and~ ~ pi
a-~a„A-~Q~,7-~yc.
By inspection of (7), it is seen that limxyo w; - a;~a and that
limzy~w; - y;~ry ~ 0. It is interesting to compare this with thc obscr-
vation in Barnett (1985) that the regular region of the ML system grows with
real income. However, budget share positivity is not guaranteed at all incorne
levels unless the coefHcients a;; and a; are constrained. In particular, the
requirements that a; 1 0 and a;; 1 0 aze su,~cient to ensure that 0 G w; C 1
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for all i(Barnett (1983) shows that these requirements are aLso sufficient for
global regularity). Unfortunately these constraints destroy the flexibility of
the ML system, as emphasized by Diewert and Wales (1987).
Section 5. Share positivity and flexibility
It is clear from the preceding section that a conflict exists between share
positivity and flexibility in the ML system. Indeed, the minimality property
of the ML system implies that any constraints on a; and a;; will destroy
flexibility.
An analogous result can be obtained for the EXP system. We have shown
in Theorem 2 that the monotonicity of A(p) and B(p) is su,~icient for budget
share positivity. In this case, of course, A(p) and B(p) cannot be flexible.
What has not been shown is that budget share positivity in the EXP system
actually contradicts the flexibilityof A and B. This is the topic of the following
theorem.
Theorem 3. If Equation (5) implies 0 G w; G 1 for all 0 G~ G-}-oo, then
neither A nor B can be flexible.
Proof: Since limx.-,o w; - B;, we must have B; - p;BB~áp; ~ 0 for w; to be
positive at all income levels. This means that the derivatives of B cannot be
equated to those of a decreasing function, contradicting flexibility.
Siuce I3; 1 0 aud ~ B; - 1, B; is contained in a bouiide~el set. Síuce
limy~~w; -(B; - A;~A)~(k f 1), w; 1 0 for all x implies A;~A G B; if
k f 1 1 0. So the elasticities of A are bounded above, contradicting the
flexibility of A. The argument when k-}- 1 G 0 is similaz. Q
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Section 6. Concluding remarks
This note has examined the implications for budget share positivity of most
Imown (nondifferential) demand systems. It has been shown that among the
nonhomothetic systems under consideration, only the EXP demands of Lew-
bel (1987b) and the ML demands of Barnett (1983) are compatible with the
requirement that 0 C w; C 1 for all income leveLs. For these two systems,
the requirement appears to be incompatible with flexibility. However, mono-
tonicity conditions on preferences do guarantee budget share positivity.
We wish to emphasize that this conflict between positivity and flexibility
is not an argument against the specifica.tion of demand systems implying pos-
itive predicted budget shares. Indeed, a concept of flexibilitty which neglects
the fact that the observations on w; lie between zero and one obviously misses
an important aspect of the data generating process. Our implication is that
the (local) concept of flexibility should be revised in the light of the (global)
requirements of regularity.
In this respect, an interesting topic for further research is the specifi-
ca,tion of positive budget shaze equations that retain sufficient flexibility for
most purposes. In particular, Diewert and Wales (1987) have shown that
globally regular cost functions exist which satisfy a requirement of "quasi-
flexibility". EXP demands might have an advantage over ML demands in
this respect, since A and B need only satisfy general requirements of differen-
tiability, monotonicity, and homogeneity: they ca.n thus be chosen with some
leeway. The simplest choice for A and B meeting all requirements (apart from
flexibility) appears to be:
log A(p) - cro - ~a? logp;
ii
B~) - ~o -F ~(~?logP:
with ~ ~? - k and ~Q? - 1. Even this simple choice for A and B, how-
ever, leads to a highly nonlineaz dernand system, Moreover, contrary to EXP
demands (where luxury goods remain luxuries at all income levels, and simi-
larly for necessities), the regulaz ML system does not imply monotonic budget
shares: it can thus approximate a wider class of income respons~. The cost
of this is a larger number of estimated patameters.
Finally, we wish to emphasize that we have not exhausted the list of
theoretically plausible Engel functions that can be specified. In particulaz,
one could increase the order of the Laurent series expansion in the Barnett
model (at the cost of a considerable increase in the number of parameters,
and consequent estimation difficulties); or investigate possible taxonomies of
more general fractional demand systems than the ones considered here (a
fairly ambitious endeavour); or investigate the Engel functions implied by the
Fourier demand system of Gallant (1981). (This does not appear stríughtfor-
ward, since the Fourier system is not separable in income, so that the Engel
functions are not explicit). These topics, however, are beyond the scope of
this paper.
FOOTNOTES
1. I wish to thank Professor A.P. Barten for suggesting the topic of this
paper, and for helpful comments. Any errors are my own.
2. It should bc~ Ilc)te(1 tllíLÍ. Il;, h;, ~;, a, í~cid h can bc~ chítiríu~tcrir,cYl fiirthc~i;
the reíuler is rcferred to thc literaturc for detíuLs.
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